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November 27, 2007

The Iraq Win

I don’t know what Bill O’Reilly meant when he asked David Letterman “Do you want the United States to win in Iraq?”  A “win” for us in WWII had a pretty clear definition: unconditional surrender of the aggressor states.  But in Iraq, there’s a little more wiggle room.  For one, the aggressor state probably won’t surrender or even admit guilt for visiting a needless war upon many millions.  Another thing, once our initial goal of eliminating WMD proved to be a red herring, the way to “win” became quite murky.  Did no WMD mean we had already won?

Since the aggressors refused to acknowledge the needlessness, illegality and moral bankruptcy of the invasion, the most logical and positive fallback objective would have been the establishment of a peaceful, democratic and prosperous Iraqi state with minimum losses to life, limb and property.  This of course just wasn’t possible, not on a budget anyway.  Our country’s new, more manageable definition of success seems to be leaving Iraq with some semblance of peace and chalking it up a W.

fallujah_locationTake, for example, the descriptions offered in Herschel Smith’s blog (Captain’s Journal) to describe “the defeat of al Qaeda” in Fallujah and the greater Anbar province.  Smith’s sources showed a great deal of candor in reporting on “a place under 24-hour lockdown, surrounded by berms and barbed wire”, but he lacks perspective in failing to ask why we would call this a “win” or in any other way desirable.  We could likely have achieved similar results with less injury to persons and property if we had simply put every Iraqi man, woman and child in jail.  In other words, we may have “successfully routed the insurgents in Anbar province”, but what about the other inhabitants?

Another of Smith’s sources says, “the story coming out of Iraq is more and more hopeful”, but all this really means is that we’ve manipulated some numbers and aren’t as ashamed as we used to be to throw them up on a TV screen and call it “a workable but messy solution”.  All of this is of course completely meaningless to anyone who must deal with the realities brought on by the US invasion.  But concern about the desires of the victims is tantamount to surrender in some circles.

The blog Cop the Truth states succinctly the administration’s straw man argument:

Successes there… means that the Liberals have been wrong all along and that maybe - just maybe - the Republicans and POTUS were right.

Now of course there is no movement in the US against easing tensions in Iraq, so I think we can safely dismiss that implication outright.   As to the literal meaning of the sentence, let’s assume for the sake of argument that the surge has been a brilliant success.  Well the surge was a change in strategy, a 30,000 troop admission of a failed policy.  So much for being “right” or “wrong all along”.  Besides, no amount of success (and I think we all hope that peace succeeds and the Iraqis regain some measure of society so we can bring our troops home) could in any way justify the initiation of aggressive war.  Just because I get away with murdering someone doesn’t make it right.fallujah-victory

It’s quite possible that we’ve presided over the deaths of a million or more Iraqis since our invasion, not to mention the flight of several million more, the destruction of that country’s economy and the reduction of its remaining residents to a state of terror.  Looks to me like in any common military sense, we’ve won, much as we won in Vietnam.  But somehow our collective conscience won’t let us depart Iraq without leaving it a better place- not a better place than we found it mind you, but a better place than we made it.  We use this attitude as evidence that we are in fact a moral people, the thing that that separates “us” from “them”.  Unfortunately, our moral compass seems to have one hell of a blind spot: the mirror.

November 24, 2007

Conspiracies and Other Bogeymen

James Pierson of the Manhattan Institute opines in the Journal today that "[Lee Harvey] Oswald shot Kennedy to interrupt his administration's plans to assassinate Castro or to overthrow his regime in Cuba", not "in the context of the civil rights struggle" as framed by the "[n]ational leaders and journalists" of the time.  The facts Pierson presents make a good argument for this much, but his ideological colors show through in his subsequent argument that "Kennedy's death marked a turning point, when the political consensus of the time gave way to the confrontational politics that we associate with the 1960s".
Pierson is mistaken in this because he apparently gives no credence to the non-Kennedy issues motivating the political discord, namely human rights (including but not limited to women's rights, minority rights, and environmental preservation).  I can't comment on whether Kennedy's death and its subsequent mishandling may have somehow made people more receptive to matters of human rights, but that hardly seems important since these issues are recognized as having worldwide importance anyway.  He continues:
Both events [Kennedy's assassination and 9/11] were expected to have unifying political effects -- but both soon gave way to intensifying periods of political conflict.
A terrible event like a terrorist attack, an assassination, or even worse an invasion should be expected to bring a country together, and I think this was observable in the immediate wake of both Kennedy's assassination and 9/11.  But initial unity will naturally give way to subsequent discord as political leaders attempt to convert broad sympathy into partisan gains.  The trick for politicians is to make their position appear to be motivated by widespread agreement or the common good instead of their own personal opinions.  The problem is people see right through this and support their own causes anyway.  This naturally elicites the type of reaction Pierson displays: in this case an attempt to discredit opponents by attributing an easily defeated argument to them, i.e. a straw man argument.
The straw man is particularly prevalent among those calling themselves Conservatives these days.  The most extreme example of a straw man I've found thus far is here.
Such suspicions encouraged the conviction that the national government is corrupt and untrustworthy -- and also that the nation itself was in some way responsible for Kennedy's death.
Leaving aside the fact that the "Government, get off my back" corporatists* would just love to get the former part of that message across, I would stress that conspiracy theories are in no way representative of or unique to any particular political philosophy.  For every Kennedy assassination or 9/11 conspiracy theorist, I have little doubt there is an equivalent survivalist, racialist, or "messiah is coming" true believer.
The extreme rhetoric of the 1960s, in which leaders were cast as "war criminals" and America was spelled with a "k," is echoed today in claims that President Bush or neoconservatives lied or manipulated the nation into war.
This stands in contradiction to Pierson's suggestion that "Oswald shot Kennedy to interrupt his administration's plans to assassinate Castro or to overthrow his regime in Cuba".  If shooting Kennedy made Oswald a criminal and Kennedy supported Castro's assassination (even as our current government supported a "decapitation" of Iraq's former regime), then Kennedy would properly belong in the same class as Oswald, i.e. criminals.  Thus Pierson himself calls Kennedy a criminal, only he can't say this directly because to do so would mean applying the same principles to ourselves as we apply to others.  Such basic moral precepts must always fall in the realm of "extreme rhetoric".
* I use this word for the sake of accuracy in lieu of "conservative" or "Republican"; I just mean the fiscal conservatives or business wing of the GOP.

November 16, 2007

The Iranian Menace

The Wall Street Journal editors must have collided with New York Times reporters yesterday and got their articles mixed up: a Journal editorialist said we were wrong to label the Revolutionary Guards a terrorist organization while the Times pushed for war with Iran… on the front page.  Sadly, I can’t say this is a surprise as it is not unusual for the Times to wax jingoistic.  To its credit, the Journal is quite willing to print the opinions of noted experts regardless of political bent, although I would guess this is as much to gain market share as it is to present a balanced perspective.

The Times reported that Iran’s government has apparently been less than forthcoming to the IAEA regarding their nuclear program.  This seems like a fair enough thing to report.  After all, if Iran isn’t upholding its obligations under the NPT, then this may be an issue the people of the US have an interest in addressing; much as they might wish to address the US government’s own failure to live up to the terms of the treaty.  But of course nobody asked them or any other country’s citizens.

Encapsulating the report in a sentence, authors Elaine Sciolino and William J. Broad write: “Mr. Khalilzad said China must understand that the only way to make diplomacy work in Iran was by forceful Council action”.  It was actually refreshing to read the word “diplomacy” used in its true context.  We so often confuse it with words like “cooperation” and “negotiation” we forget that, to our government, the effective meaning is much closer to “coercion”.

The US government uses sound moral reasoning to conclude that a nuclear weapon capable Iran might strike us.  After all, if Iran can take out key civilian targets, they may be able to break our chain of command and prevent a counterattack.  That way, they’d actually save lives- both theirs and ours- and bring our war against the Axis of Evil to an end.

In actuality, however, no such a preemptive strike would be able to avert a US counterstrike, which Iran’s leaders no doubt know.  They are also probably aware of Pakistan’s, India’s, and Israel’s road to nuclear armament and what this means for them, both regionally and with respect to Security Council relations.  So will Iran develop nukes?  The most honest answer for a non-expert like myself is that I don’t know.  I would guess that like Japan they might maintain a dormant capability to produce and deploy them quickly should the regime ever deem it necessary.

I personally don’t see what purpose these weapons have other than to hold the entire population of the world hostage, and I think most people would agree.  I think they are attractive to regimes besieged from without as a last hedge against annihilation.  Externally oppressive regimes generally needn’t fear destruction, so they probably see nukes as a way to expand their dominance.  To find which category a given regime belongs to, observe that regime’s troop deployments.

In the case of the US, our stance on Iran would seem to be equal parts paranoia and hypocrisy: paranoia because Iran could not employ such weapons against US cities without almost certain knowledge of an unprecedented holocaust being inflicted directly back upon their country; hypocrisy because the US government actually does very little to prevent nuclear proliferation or even a nuclear attack against the US itself.  I think an examination of power and financial arrangements will reveal the causes for US hostility towards Iran.

November 13, 2007

Health Care Clarity?

Pacific Research Institute's John R. Graham contributed a commentary today to the Wall Street Journal called "The Health Cost Myth".  His premise seems to be that our current system of health care is not, as some believe, in need of replacement by a government administered system.  He writes:
Over the past eight years, the percentage of firms offering health benefits to employees has dropped significantly, to 60% from 69%... almost completely accounted for by businesses with fewer than 10 employees... These firms find health benefits unaffordable because states have laid a massive burden of over-regulation on small-group health insurance since the early 1990s, making it increasingly expensive.
In fact, even with higher costs across the board, US citizens continue to do better under our market based health care system than their counterparts under socialized medicine:
Even after paying for our health care, Americans have far more money left over than their neighbors to spend on other goods and services. It works out to about $8,000 more than the average German or Frenchman, and about $4,000 more than the average Canadian or Briton.
But lest you think he's heartless, Graham offers that: "Of course, averages obscure many harsh realities and hide the fact that many Americans are unable to afford health care."  His recommendation isn't socialism, but rather:
To improve the state of American health care and lighten the burden on business and workers, policy leaders should push for portability of health benefits, transparent pricing for health services, tort reform and more competition among both insurers and providers.
In final analysis, however, Mr. Graham's commentary lacks clarity both in practical and moral matters.  Practically, he doesn't explain why socialized medicine is necessarily less efficient than an HMO-run industry.  He gives one example of something like this, but makes no effort to elaborate.
Morally, he seems to touch upon the idea that everyone should have health care, but never states it outright or explains how this might come about.  It might be assumed that according to his logic the HMOs would eventually provide a system so efficient that everyone could be covered, but he provides no reason as to why HMOs should wish to cut into their profit margin to ensure those whose health isn't economically viable.  This would presumably be legislative intervention, but according to Graham this automatically makes it more expensive.
From a capitalist perspective, the failure to provide universal coverage is a factor of the market: those who can't afford it can't get it.  Stripped of its market based apologetics and put into moral terms, this means that the poor are less deserving of life than the wealthy because they can't afford it.  This might not be Mr. Graham's point of view, but he offers precious little to dispel the sentiment.

The Remilitarization of Germany

The hawks are once again beating their war drums.  Successive articles by Roger Cohen in the Times and Mark Helprin in the Journal call on Germany to develop its ability to make offensive war.  Writes Cohen:
... the link between slaughter in Madrid, London or Amsterdam and the Afghan-Pakistani terror nexus seems unconvincing to many Europeans floating on an Iraq-comforted wave of moral smugness.
This is a fundamental misconstruction of history.  The US, UK, and other European agents have been meddling in Afghanistan for centuries.  It should hardly come as a surprise that there would be retaliation, only that it took so long.  This is not to say that such retaliation is justified, but it's at least as justified as the original meddling.
... it’s time to bring on the Bundesmacht and past time for continental Europe to overcome its pacifist mirage and accept that these are dangerous times demanding serious defense budgets and sacrifice.
The pivotal question is sacrifice for what?  Anyone serious about defeating terrorism would have to strike at its reason for being, most significantly the sense of injustice that leads the disempowered to terrorism.  One big step in ending this injustice would be for us not to invade other countries or support those who do.
Another effective counterterrorism tactic is to attack terrorists and spare civilians.  The US was attacked by terrorists on 11. September 2001.  Assuming bin Laden's al Qaeda was in fact behind the attack (which of course we the peons are not privileged to know), then a reasonable reaction might have been to attack that organization.  But instead of attacking that one organization, we attacked two unrelated countries (one of which was willing to help us get bin Laden) and let al Qaeda slip away.  To this day, we know where al Qaeda is, but apparently Al Qaeda just isn't very important to us.
Helprin focuses more on Germany's vulnerability and need to militarize, recommending:
For its own protection, and thus that of Europe, Germany could more closely integrate and where appropriate reintegrate itself into the expeditionary and nuclear retaliatory structures of the U.S., Britain, and France without moving nuclear weapons forward to German soil; end leniency for terrorists; step up defensive measures as if it is just about to be hit; and embrace limited missile defense against potentially nuclear-armed Iranian intermediate-range ballistic missiles rather than accept the Russian thesis that 10 interceptors will perturb the nuclear equation.
In plain English, Germany should take its place alongside US invasion forces, support the nuclear threat, install a police state, and provide the US with a platform to dominate Russia.
Though it is conceivable that after the shock of losing Washington or Chicago, the U.S. -- or Britain after Birmingham, France after Lyon -- would, even without an address certain, release a second strike, it is very unlikely that, even with an address certain, any nuclear power would launch in behalf of another nation, NATO ally or not, absent an explicit arrangement such as the dual-key structure during the Cold War.
It's a comforting thought that intellectuals who ponder the calculus for nuclear war can accept with Zen-like repose the willful annihilation of millions of admitted innocents.  I hope they have the candor to make their stances widely known so that their corrupted morals and illegal weapons can be broadly rejected and eliminated.

November 10, 2007

Religion as a Business?

Clark Strand writes in the WSJ today that "Jewish and Christian models offer the most logical solution for reversing [the decline in American Buddhism]".  This may seem like an unusual for the Journal, but some of the views Strand expresses may serve to elucidate, starting with the idea of the "model" religious institutions ought to follow.

The "model" is of course a concept straight out of the business world, especially as the word "model" itself is really just shorthand for "business model", although this might seem a bit crass when applied top religion.  But why would that be?

The obvious answer is that people see religion as an institution supposedly ordained by some higher power, not something for mankind to tinker with, a polar opposite of the business model.  But in fact this apparently oxymoronic "religious business model" seems to be gaining momentum in the world of faith, for example at the Living Faith Center (LFC) in Santa Barbara, where the new pastor is seeking to build "more and better Christians".

Thus religion becomes yet another outpost for the corporate mindset and becomes fodder for the WSJ.  For some the faith of the masses was always something to be exploited, e.g. the televangelists, shrivers.  The new wave is simply being more explicit in their drive for assembly line style efficiency.

But will there be a backlash?  Probably not an immediate or obvious shift, but as these market-driven evangelists continue to spread the Word using the latest techniques in marketing and management, they are likely to reach the point of diminishing returns: market saturation.

November 07, 2007

Our Assault on the Law

Mssrs. David B. Rivkin, Jr. and Lee A. Casey write in the WSJ today that when it comes to fighting terrorism, "the justice system will be of limited utility because... it is not designed to anticipate and stop criminal behavior before it takes place."  Seems like a rational enough thought.  One big step in preventing terrorist attacks would be to correct the injustices which foment the mass movements that sometimes resort to terrorist tactics.  But if correcting injustice had been the authors' intent, it of course never would have made it into the WSJ.  In fact, these two Reagan/Bush41 Justice Department officials make an impassioned plea against reliance on the methods of law and justice in combating terrorism.

Rather, they seem to say, ways to "make... judicial systems more capable of meeting the challenge" include

establishing or broadening the offense of terrorism to include membership in a terrorist organization; approving sometimes long pretrial detention for terror suspects; banning organizations with terrorist connections; and legalizing the use of deportation and expulsion of suspected terrorist suspects in some cases... permitting more closed proceedings and less technically demanding evidentiary standards"

To them, "the assumption that it is better to let the guilty go free than to convict the innocent" is "an appropriate balance when a society is dealing with its own reprobates" but "not so obviously correct when the threat is a foreign movement whose purpose is to cause death and destruction on a grand scale."  While I'm sure we can I'll agree on the necessity of countering such threats, it is difficult to see how convicting more innocent people will do this.

It's likely that these very limitations [of justice in combating terrorism], at least in part, prompted the Bush administration to eschew a policing response to the September 11 attacks, and to declare a war against terror.

 The administration apparently also eschewed a military response as well, at least against terrorist organizations.

Only the law of armed conflict permits the flexibility needed to disrupt al Qaeda's operations on an international level.

Agreed.  Unfortunately in using torture, denying POWs the rights we would expect for our own soldiers, and generally running roughshod over our international obligations and the tenets of basic decency, we have unequivocally set aside those norms of conduct.

Had the Bush administration followed a law-enforcement path, and sought the judicial assistance of Afghanistan's Taliban, Osama bin Laden would still be secure in his bases and training facilities, far more capable of planning and executing future attacks.

This turns history on its head.  The Taliban offered to hand bin Laden over requesting only the evidence that he was behind the Sep. 11 attacks, but we refused.  Either we had no evidence, or we had some other motive for refusing.  Whatever the reason, it was a massive blow to the counter-terrorism effort.  Our intelligence today confirms that bin Laden is in fact "secure in his bases and training facilities, far more capable of planning and executing future attacks."  Maybe acting according to laws and morals has some utility after all...

November 06, 2007

On Waterboarding and Hiroshima

Wall Street Journal (WSJ) columnist Bret Stephens says waterboarding is as least as morally justifiable as the allied bombing campaigns of WWII.  He writes today:

... the horror of what was done to Hamburg and the other cities dwarfs in moral scale the worst U.S. abuses in the war on terror (real or alleged)...

Not so: Iraqi deaths since the invasion have reached comparable levels, never mind the crippling regime of sanctions against the Iraqi people since the war began in 1991.

... the question here isn't about the intrinsic morality of the bombing. It's about whether the good that flowed from the bombing outweighed the unmistakable evil of the act itself.

Means tend to be ends in themselves; i.e. there's no very sensible way to justify them solely on the basis of possible future consequences.  For example, another WSJ columnist recently asserted that the death penalty reduced crime in direct proportion to its frequency of use.  By Mr. Stephen's logic, we ought to lower the bar for its usage, because even though we know more innocent people will be put to death, nevertheless because it will result in lower crime and ultimately less people killed, it is justified.

Whatever side one takes here, the important point is that the debate fundamentally is about results. Note the difference with the current debate over waterboarding, where opponents argue that the technique is unconscionable and inadmissible under any circumstances, even in hypothetical cases where the alternative to waterboarding is terrorist attacks resulting in mass casualties among innocent civilians.

Results can always be achieved through ruthlessness and cruelty.  A basic understanding of morality would point to the fact that the tables might be turned at any time.  If this knowledge does not affect one's thinking, it shows a fundamental callousness towards basic moral precepts.

... awful things would have to be done in order to be spared greater harms. One senses Judge Mukasey understands that too -- further evidence of his fitness to serve as attorney general.

My concern is the sanguinity with which the pro-torture faction approaches the "awful things... to be done".  They never seem to ask how effective such things really are in the first place and simply take their needfulness as a commonplace.  Mukasey looks like little more than an administration puppet when he dissembles whether a practice he finds "over the line" and "repugnant" qualifies as cruel or unusual punishment.

November 05, 2007

To the English speaking readers

Welcome everyone.  This blog's purpose is to discuss important current events along with their causes and ramifications, both in Mandarin Chinese and English.  Like most people I'm a fallible human, so readers' contributions are always welcome, especially in the form of the right questions.  I look forward to blogging with everyone.
Ben Lowsen

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